The effect of state duty to warn laws inspired by Tarasoff v Regents has been debated for decades. Required reporting of patient threats to the authorities and potential victims gives incentive to the mental health professional to not meet with the most at risk patients, or at very least make the current state of the law abundantly clear to the patient as to suggest suppression of the most at risk statements leaving the psychologist in liability-free ignorance to the true mental state of the patient. As a result, the mental help needed to treat the patient may be foregone and violence may ensue. Using a fixed effects model and exploiting the variation in the timing and style of duty to warn laws across states, I find that mandatory duty to warn laws cause an increase in homicides of 8.9% or 0.76 people per 100,000. These results are robust to model specifications, falsification tests, and help to clarify the true, albeit adverse, effect of state duty to warn laws.
Introduction
In its landmark ruling in 1976, Tarasoff v Regents of the Universities of California 1 (hereafter Tarasoff) set the standard for the duty a mental health professional owes third parties whose lives are threatened by the patient of the mental health professional. In subsequent years, each state enacted a similar law, but with variation in the duty required of the mental health professional. At the onset of Tarasoff, the duty owed to third parties became the subject of a "cottage industry of commentary" (Perlin 1992) in both the legal and mental health services communities. Since Tarasoff, both legal scholars and mental health professionals have argued that patients at most risk of dangerous activity will miss out on necessary counseling due to the costs mental health professionals incur while counseling risky patients (Stone 1976 , Fliszar 2002 , Ginsberg 2007 . Ackerman (1976) predicted the result of Tarasoff to be the "end of effective psychotherapy" while Ginsberg (2004) suggested that the Tarasoff ruling "might be a valuable clinical tool". Many early critics of Tarasoff eased off their original position (Stone 1984) , but the question of Tarasoff's effectiveness in deterring violence, and specifically homicides, remains unanswered empirically. This analysis attempts to tease out the dominating effect of Tarasoff by using a codification of Tarasoff laws and a fixed effects (FE) model to estimate Tarasoff's effect on homicides in the United States. This should help fill the gap of proposed legal theory by analyzing the effect of duty to warn laws on state level homicide rates.
The Economics of Crime
Economists and other researchers have tried to explain why crime rose steadily in the 1980's and abruptly fell in the early 1990's. Based on economic theory, the reasons for the sudden changes in crime are expansive and far reaching (Levitt 2004) . One theory suggests a causal relationship between mental illness and crime. Either as the victim (Sliver et. al. 2008 , Teplin et. al. 2005 , Choe et. al. 2008 , or perpetrator (Link et. al. 1995 , Nestor 2002 , previous literature suggests a causal link between sufferers of mental illness and crime. Marcotte and Markowitz's (2009) findings suggest that improving the treatment of psychiatric patients through prescription drugs decreases the number of harmful crimes committed in the United States. The findings presented here further strengthen the argument of a causal link between mental health and crime.
Many of the policy proposals presented in recent years to decrease violent crime have not been implemented due to the highly charged political nature of the intervening factors. A clear understanding of state duty to warn laws will aid in policy making and life saving for a number of reasons and does not fall victim to the factors that have plagued much of the research done on the topic for the last twenty years. While any positive statement about the effect of abortion Levitt 2001, Joyce 2009 ), gun control (Ayres and Donohue 2003, Black and Nagin 1998,) , or the death penalty (Dezhbakhsh et. al. 2003 , Katz et. al. 2003 ) on crime will be difficult to implement, duty to warn laws have no political prior and are potentially more likely to have bipartisan support for a change if required. The findings in this paper suggest life saving policy implications that potentially will not be bogged down in political strife.
Legal History
At the core of tort theory is the existence of duty of one person to another. In order to be found negligent, a tortfeasor must have owed a duty of care to the victim and breached that duty.
The duty doctrine inspires would-be tortfeasors to act in a manner that is better for society than the tortfeasor might have acted otherwise (Hylton 2006) . Under classic tort theory, therapists counseling dangerous patients would owe no duty to potential victims or law enforcement agencies. Theory suggests that socially beneficial life-saving warnings to potential victims carried out by the therapist might be preferred to an absence of duty. In general, the therapist would not owe a duty to a third party, but the courts have ruled that the situation of a hostile patient is an exception to this duty standard. This exception of third party duty was first established by a tragedy of love gone wrong.
After unsuccessful attempts to court Tatiana Tarasoff, Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student at the University of California at Berkeley in the late 1960's, found himself in a deep depression. At the counsel of some friends, he sought professional help from a psychologist at the university hospital in Berkeley. While receiving counseling, Poddar admitted desires to kill Tarasoff. Poddar's psychologist had Poddar detained temporarily, but at the discretion of the superior psychologist, Poddar was released. Neither Tarasoff nor her family were ever made aware of Poddar's intentions.
2 Later, Poddar successfully carried out his plan and murdered
Tarasoff. The family of Tarasoff sued the hospital, the psychologist, and the superior stating that a professional duty should exist to protect third parties from eminent harm.
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of California ruled that while traditionally no duty is afforded to a third party, in the case of mental healthcare professionals, a duty to warn a third party exists under certain circumstances, and the failure to warn is cause for suit. In subsequent years, dramatic changes occurred in both the law associated with therapeutic professionals and the way they conducted business (Wise 1976 , Givelber et al. 1980 A survey of mental health professionals by Givelber, et al. (1980) found that 86% of psychologists living outside of California were aware of the ruling in Tarasoff, and psychologists were 30% more likely post Tarasoff to commit patients involuntarily to the hospital. Another empirical study of Tarasoff's effect on psychological practice, Wise (1978) found that 25% of therapists reported greater patient reluctance to discuss violent thoughts, and more recently, Rosenhan et al. (1993) reported that 60% of therapists felt that patients were at least somewhat more reluctant to discuss sensitive information.
While these studies are informative and give some insight into the mechanism by which Tarasoff laws affect homicides, it is important to note that sample selection may bias results, as psychologists may have incentive to overestimate Tarasoff's negative effects in an effort to give evidence to overturn the law that heightens their own liability. While surveys of therapists might over-report the negative effects of Tarasoff, similar bias is no likely to be found in a state level panel of homicides.
As additional self-protection, the therapist has a strong incentive to make the current state of the law known to the patient (Klinka 2009) 18 . To completely avoid liability, a therapist will likely warn the patient ex ante, both verbally and by signed contract, of the law to allow the 18 specifically note 213 of Klinka (2009) patient to monitor what is divulged. The evidence found in previous research suggests that this happens at least in part. Ex-post, there would be incentive on the part of the mental health professional to hide knowledge of homicidal tendencies of the patient by destroying notes made on the patient, or by lying about conversations. This is not likely to happen because in most cases, the murderer can be called as a witness against the psychologist, and in many cases, the murderer has met with multiple mental health professionals. It might also be the case that with improvements in mental health care, regular physicians might prescribe medications to combat mental health issues and completely bypass the role of the psychologist. This is likely to happen in many scenarios and is why changes in duty to warn laws only explain a portion of the variation in homicides.
As a result there are two possible effects when a duty to warn is required. The intention of the law is to stop patients from committing heinous acts of violence by warning the potential victim. If this were true, homicides should decrease. It could also be that increasingly aggressive duty laws against doctors will prohibit would-be patients from getting necessary mental counseling. This prohibitive effect likely happens through a number of channels.
Patients might know the duty to warn laws in their state and be discouraged from seeking and receiving mental help (Wise 1976 , Rosenhan et. al. 1998 , Klinka 2009 ). In addition, doctors face strong incentives to make the relevant duty to warn laws apparent to the patient to imply an attitude of non-disclosure on the topic of sensitive subjects. Another likely channel of deterrence could be in the selection of patients a therapist is willing to treat (Borum and Reddy 2001) . The risk of liability might be sufficiently great as to deter doctors from even counseling "risky"
patients (Klinka 2009 , Harmon 2008 . Given the ambiguity of the effects, the question is one best answered empirically.
This analysis contributes to the related literature by offering some empirical evidence of Tarasoff's effect and helps answer many of the theoretical questions raised by the Tarasoff duty over the past 20 years as well as explaining the rise and fall in crime over the last twenty years.
In addition, it builds on recent work that links mental health conditions to crime in the United
States (Marcotte and Markowitz 2009 ).
Model
I employ two common measures of homicides and estimate every model with both measures of homicides to ensure robustness of the results. A key component to the analysis is quantifying the qualitative heterogeneity in duty to warn laws. The first method is to employ a set of dummy variables that take on the values indicating whether each state/year cell has a mandatory duty to warn law, discretionary duty to warn law, or no law and is modeled like this:
where h is the natural log of homicides per 100,000 that vary by state i and time t, X is a matrix of covariates, 19 s and y are state and year dummies, e is the error term, m is a binary variable that takes on the value one when state i in time t has a mandatory duty to warn, and zero otherwise. d is a binary variable that takes on the value one when state i in time t has a discretionary duty to warn and zero otherwise. 
The variable m in equation (1) is expanded to three binary variables that incorporate the governing body deciding the law. The variable mc measures the effect of mandatory duty laws decided by the state court system. These are states that, when presented with evidence similar to Tarasoff, have ruled that a common law duty to warn exists. ms measures the effect of mandatory duty laws enacted by state statutory law, and ml measures the effect of state judicial ruling that has dictated a duty to warn will be enacted when the fact pattern is presented to the courts. This situation occurs normally when the question presented before the court is something related to, but not exactly, the issue presented in Tarasoff. If, for example, a state court comes to a ruling about a psychologist duty to report child abuse, the court usually discusses a Tarasoff duty to warn. 21 The advantage to this model specification is that it allows states to switch from civil law to statutory law as a state codifies existing common law doctrine. 
which follow the same specifications as equations (1) and (2) A common approach is to convert the count of homicides per state per year to rates of homicides per 100,000 residents of the state population and take the natural log of that rate. This transformation lends itself more closely to OLS estimation, as the log of the homicide rate is nearly normally distributed. The preferred specification for this analysis is a FE estimator where the dependent variable takes on the form of the log of the homicide rates. As seen in FE estimation does, however, have serious potential threats to unbiased estimation. Chief among those concerns is the possibility of underestimated standard errors caused by failure to identify serial correlation, non-random treatment (or non-random assignment of duty laws) and the usual binary nature of the treatment variable (Bertrand et. al. 2004 ). Bertrand et al. (2004) show that clustered standard errors at the state level correct for serial correlation by allowing for correlation in the error terms within state across time. This resolves the issue of understated error terms by, in many cases, conservatively overstating them in allowing the error terms to be robust and correlated. In this analysis, I use a test developed by Wooldridge (2002) to test for serial correlation in the error terms and correct as needed. The other concern is the non-random assignment of law. The possibility of non-random treatment and policy endogeneity will be discussed further in the Robustness section.
Data
The data on homicide rates comes from a variety of places. The preferred measure of homicides comes from the WISAQARS database compiled by the CDC from the National shortcomings in the monthly reporting (Marcotte and Markowitz 2009, and Katz et. al 2003) .
SHR data is collected from volunteer participation of law enforcement agencies across the United States. The SHR has some missing data, likely due to self reporting, but overall accounts for 90% of homicides (Joyce 2009 ). One advantage of using the SHR data on homicides is that it allows me to take out of the count of homicides committed by a stranger to the victim. Given the "readily identifiable victim" standard required to impose a Tarsoff duty, I'd expect Tarasoff laws to also explain the variation in homicides by non-strangers in the same manner as the full sample of homicides. In addition, the magnitude of the effect of these duty to warn laws should be greater in the subsample of homicides by non-strangers. For this study, the NCHS count of homicides will be the main source of homicide data, as it appears to be more inclusive of homicides in the United States and does not rely on voluntary reporting, but the UCR-SHR homicide count of non-stranger homicides provide a useful robustness check of the results found using the NCHS data.
State demographic characteristics included in all models consists of median age, percent of the population that is black, percent of the population that is male and median income. These all come from census micro-level data compiled by the IPUMS website (Ruggles et al. 2009 ).
State unemployment rates collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics are included. One major concern in any analysis of U.S. crime rates through the 1980's is the prevalence of crack cocaine and its effect on violence. Unfortunately, good national measures of crack usage are scarce (Levitt 2004 Table 3 estimates equation (1), column (2) estimations equation (2) and so on respectively. Table 4 replicates Table 3 using UCR-SHR data on homicides by nonstrangers. Tables 3 and 4 simple coding of mandatory duty laws yields positive and significant results. When these laws are expanded, the law that remains significant across specifications is statutory mandatory duty law. Tables 3 and 4 report a positive and significant coefficient on the measure of mandatory duty laws created by state legislations (mandatory duty (statutory law)) suggesting that all else equal, states with statutory mandatory duty laws have on average 1.2 more homicides per 100,000 of the population compared to states with no laws.
Results

Estimation
Comparing Table 3 to Table 4 , we see that in general, the significance and sign of each law does not change. We do observe, however, that the magnitude of the estimated effects of the Tarasoff laws increases by anywhere from 2% to 7% when I restrict homicides to homicides by non-strangers. This is consistent with the notion that these duty to warn laws apply most closely to victims where the murderer is known because those are the only types of murders reasonably affected by Tarasoff's ruling given the "readily identifiable victim" standard and suggests some degree of robustness to the results.
Columns (3) and (4) in each respective table compensate for the possibility of a lag effect of duty laws. Newly created law, regardless of the venue of creation, might take time to make its presence known. In addition, each state was coded to have the law for the entire year in which it was enacted. To check the robustness of the results, each law is lagged a year. Comparing the results of the coefficients between columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) for each specification suggest that though magnitudes change slightly, signs and significance of each result does not. This suggests that if there is a lag effect, the lag effect is similar to the direct effect.
The coefficient on the discretionary duty variable is consistently negative across specifications, but insignificant. The negative sign suggests that given the opportunity to decide when to report, therapists successfully distinguish between real threats and idle patient banter, but the large variance prohibits any sort of meaningful interpretation.
There is still another model specification that provides additional evidence of the effect of duty to warn laws. The timing of the court decisions in Tables 3 and 4 Tables 5 and 6 replicate Tables 3 and   4 with the mc and the ml variables recoded to reflect the timing of the lower court opinions. We see that signs and significances do not change, though magnitudes fluctuate slightly.
Robustness
The results suggest robustness across data sources (NCHS, UCR-SHR), coding of the independent variables of interest (level, lagged), and timing of court decisions. In addition, I present further evidence that the results are not particularly sensitive to slight changes in the data.
One potential source of bias might be from an overly influential state that biases the results. To check for this I ran each regression 47 30 times dropping each time a different state from the estimation. The summary statistics of these regressions are displayed in Table 7 . The means in that new law will open the "flood gates of litigation" and be overly burdensome to the legal system. To avoid frivolous cases against therapeutic professionals, law makers have found it necessary to set an extremely high threshold for the amount of potential harm. Thus, a threat of assault would not necessarily require a therapist to report the patient, and consequently, these duty laws should have no effect on assault rates. Table 7 replicates the estimation of equations (1) - (4) where the dependent variable is the natural log of the assault rate as reported by the UCR database. As seen in Table 7 , duty to warn laws do not have a significant effect on assaults 31 The same test was performed for the UCR-SHR data and the results were essentially the same and are available upon request. 32 In addition to the evidence presented here, three year leads of the duty to warn laws were included in each model and were found insignificant in almost every instance suggesting that the laws do not reflect some underlying trend in crime. suggesting that what is being captured by the duty to warn laws is not some spurious trend in crime but rather a causal relationship.
To further this falsification test, I replicate equations (1) - (4) with differing measures of crime that these duty to warn laws should not explain. The dependent variables are the natural log of the auto theft rate, larceny rate, and robbery rate as measured by the UCR. In total, 30 coefficients of interest were estimated in 12 models and only three of the duty to warn coefficients were significant at the ten percent level. This is approximately what is expected and suggests that changes in these laws are not explaining some underlying spurious trend in crime in the United States.
Another potential problem may be policy endogeneity. Typically, policy endogeneity plays a biasing role in state panels through a number a ways. One way is through some sort of political party bias. Figure 1 shows the current state of duty to warn laws in each state. As seen in Figure 1 , there is no clear political line drawn for any particular type of law. Thus, there appears to be no clustering in laws by political ideology. 36 In addition, there appears to be little to no clustering of state duty laws by region. Each type of law is represented in each region of the United States.
The chief concern would be how each state decided its respective duty to warn laws. The laws could possibly be endogenous if they were created as response to some statewide trend in crime. This is likely not the case. Tarasoff and its subsequent rulings have been matter of clarification of law rather than a mechanism to combat crime. If state legislators or state judges want to appear tough on crime, they will increase law enforcement spending and the like rather than tweaking duty to warn laws. It could be the case that state policy makers react with 36 For instance, Texas and Connecticut have similar duty laws but are on opposite ends of the universe politically. In addition, California, Utah, Idaho, and Massachusetts all have similar laws, but generally are polar opposites politically.
legislation to a high profile murder where psychological counseling should have played a role. If this is the case, it furthers the exogeneity of the law as long as the occurrence of the high profile murder (the shootings at Columbine, Virginia Tech, or Northern Illinois for example) is fairly close to random and does not reflect any sort of state trend in homicides. Bias could also be introduced into the model if these laws were enacted as part of a larger health care bill. This was the case with the state of Nebraska, 37 but as seen in Table 5 , dropping Nebraska doesn't significantly change the results. Thus, it can be said with some certainty that the implementation and style of duty laws are fairly close to random.
As stated earlier, an addition test of the sensitivity of the results is the alternate timing scheme for states that enacted Tarasoff laws through adjudication. Every duty to warn law decided in a court was appealed and reviewed at least by the relevant state court of appeals but most often by the respective state supreme court. If we are interested in finding out at which point mental health professionals began to respond to the Tarasoff ruling, it is necessary to check alternate specifications. In the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 , the law wasn't considered law until the state supreme court ruled, 38 but it is also likely that mental health professionals began responding to duty to warn laws at the lower courts' decisions. We see in Tables 5 and 6 that though the magnitude fluctuates slightly, signs and significances remain robust.
Conclusion
The effect of state duty to warn laws on homicidal activity has been debated for decades.
This paper shows that all else equal, mandatory duty to warn laws cause an increase in homicides of 8.9% or 0.76 people per 100,000. 39 This is consistent with previous literature that suggests 22 that worsening mental health conditions lead to more crime. Duty to warn laws change the incentives of both the patient and the doctor. The original intention of the law was to deter dangerous patients from committing heinous crimes, but what actually happened was that the law changed the incentives to the patient and the doctor such that the patient has incentive to withhold homicidal tendencies, and the doctor has incentive to not explore homicidal tendencies.
In addition, these laws increase the liability to health professionals and incentivize those professionals to not treat the most at risk patients, or at very least make the current state of the law abundantly clear to the patient as to suggest suppression of the most dangerous statements leaving the psychologist in liability-free ignorance to the true mental state of the patient. As a result the mental help needed to treat the patient is foregone, and all too often violence ensues.
I find these results to be robust across a multitude of specifications and falsification tests.
The policy implications are simple and fairly easily employed. A change in law to no duty or discretionary duty should cause a decrease in homicides. Court cases, in these regressions, were coded to be decided after the lower court ruled as opposed to the highest court ruling. A detailed outline of mandatory and discretionary duty to warn laws can be found in Edwards (2010) . * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001 Table 3 . Thus, each row represents the descriptive statistics of the estimated coefficients of 47 regressions. Panels (3) and (4) represent lagged laws. 
